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CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: 




Edward A. Danielyan 
Throughout her Negotiation and Mediation course at the 
University of California, Irvine School of Law, Professor Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow1 instructed her students to be prudent, diligent, creative 
and cooperative negotiators. This note is based on an assignment from 
Professor Menkel-Meadow’s course and is thus subject to inherent 
limitations in its scope. 
As a renowned national and international expert in alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR), Professor Menkel-Meadow facilitated the 
growth and frequency of use of ADR in the United States since the late 
1970s and early 1980s,2 and has continued to develop this field of study 
to present day.3 
This note focuses on three concepts that make a negotiator effective: 
(1) necessity of strategic and thorough preparation before negotiations; 
(2) use of framing and establishment of reputation during negotiations; 
and (3) flexibility in resorting to facilitated mediation. My analysis of 
these concepts is discussed through the thirteen days of negotiations 
 
Edward Aleksandrovich Danielyan is a Juris Doctor candidate at the University of California, Irvine 
School of Law. 
1. Professor Menkel-Meadow is a founder of the dispute resolution field. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 
UCI LAW, https://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/menkel-meadow/ [https://perma.cc/845B-
828Y] (last visited Apr. 5, 2019). In addition to a plethora of other awards, the first-ever Award for 
Outstanding Scholarly Work, presented by the American Bar Association’s Dispute Resolution section, 
was presented to Professor Menkel-Meadow, who was lauded as a “tireless, prolific and influential 
researcher and writer” who put forth the transformative idea of “lawyer as problem solver” twenty-five 
years ago. Id. Published in dozens of books and articles, Professor Menkel-Meadow has  
also taught at some of the most prestigious legal institutions in the United States and worldwide.  
See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Curriculum Vitae, https://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/menkel-
meadow/menkelmeadowCV.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3PZ-BHWE] ( last visited Apr. 5, 2019). 
2. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Regulation of Dispute Resolution in the United States of 
America: From the Formal to the Informal to the ‘Semi-formal’, in REGULATING DISPUTE  
RESOLUTION: ADR AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS 419 (Felix Steffek et al. eds., 2013). 
3. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1. 
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between President John F. Kennedy (JFK) and Soviet Premier Nikita 
S. Khrushchev (Khrushchev) during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. 
This paper is divided into two major components. First, I will analyze 
the United States’ initial contemplation in response to evidence of the 
Soviet Union’s construction of offensive-weapon bases in Cuba. Then, I 
will analyze the correspondences between JFK and Khrushchev leading 
up to the United Nations-based mediation sessions. 
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It is important to recognize the existence of dozens of considerations and 
factors leading up to the October 1962 negotiations between JFK and Khrushchev. 
Due to the nature of this paper, I am unable to provide an exhaustive synopsis of 
every relevant consideration affecting both parties during this international conflict. 
Furthermore, this Note takes a somewhat oversimplified approach to the multi-
lateral aspect of international negotiations; I excluded mention of JFK’s and 
Khrushchev’s advisors (such as Robert Kennedy), foreign ministers, military 
commanders, and other relevant parties directly involved in the behind-the-scenes 
strategy making processes. 
Although there is a voluminous amount of sources available regarding the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, the inherently complex nature of international disputes— 
e.g. the effects on the global perception of a state’s foreign policy, image, and 
strength—are also largely omitted from this Note. As such, this Note’s narrow 
scope is geared towards the procedural, tactical, and analytical elements of the 
thirteen days of negotiations between JFK and Khrushchev. The main sources 
guiding my discussion are: The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962;4 Reflections on the Cuban 
 
4. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962 (Laurence Chang & Peter Kornbluh eds., 1992). 
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Missile Crisis;5 Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962;6 The Great Negotiations;7 Negotiation: 
Processes for Problem Solving;8 Getting to Yes;9 and Art of the Deal.10 
INITIAL CONTEMPLATION 
Prepare Well for Negotiations 
On October 16, 1962, JFK along with the National Security Advisor 
McGeorge Bundy and other top advisors (collectively, The Executive Committee 
of the National Security Council (ExComm)), received images of Soviet medium-
range ballistic missile bases under construction in Cuba.11 ExComm faced a difficult 
decision of how to respond to the Soviet Union’s actions. Although ExComm and 
JFK contemplated various options, my analysis focuses on two possible responses 
to the pending threat emanating ninety miles from U.S. soil: (1) eliminating the bases 
through air and ground strikes; or (2) instituting a blockade on Soviet ships carrying 
weapons to Cuba.12 
The deliberations between JFK and ExComm in choosing an adequate 
response to Soviet actions in Cuba best resemble conducting substantive legal 
research prior to a negotiation. Specifically, preparing for a negotiation by carefully 
analyzing the parameters of the issue allows a party to approach conflict resolution 
in an effective and anticipatory manner, likely yielding better results. 
Strike: Factual Background 
ExComm unanimously recognized the need to eliminate the Soviet missile 
bases from Cuba, because the bases posed a high risk to the U.S. national security.13 
JFK and his advisors initially approached accomplishing this need by contemplating 
an air strike because: (1) it would include the element of surprise since the Soviet 
Union was not aware of the United States’ knowledge of the bases; (2) there was a 
sense of urgency to act because the bases were not yet operational; and (3) the air 
strike would quickly alleviate the immediate Soviet threat in Cuba.14 Additionally, 
conducting an air strike would illustrate the strength of the United States in the 
 
5. RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF, REFLECTIONS ON THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (2d ed. 1989). 
6. TIM COATES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962: SELECTED FOREIGN POLICY 
DOCUMENTS FROM THE ADMINISTRATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY, JANUARY 1961–NOVEMBER 1962 
(2002). 
7. FREDRIK STANTON, GREAT NEGOTIATIONS: AGREEMENTS THAT CHANGED THE 
MODERN WORLD (2011). 
8. CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., NEGOTIATION: PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM SOLVING 
(2d ed. 2014). 
9. ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING 
IN. (3d ed., 2011). 
10. DONALD TRUMP, THE ART OF THE DEAL (1987). 
11. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, supra note 4, at 77. 
12. Id. at 78. 
13. Id. at 79. 
14. Id. 
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international arena as a major superpower. Once the option of an air strike was on 
the list of possible United States responses, ExComm began further deliberations, 
engaging in a fuller analysis of the implications and consequences of military 
action.15 Air Force officials stated the air strike would need to be massive against 
Cuba rather than a surgical one, and at best, it would only eliminate 60-90 percent 
of the missiles in Cuba.16 Furthermore, an air strike would: (1) potentially upset  
U.S. allies because there would not be enough time to consult them; (2) bring about 
a maximum communist reaction in Latin America;17 and (3) serve as irrevocable 
action on United States’ behalf. Robert Kennedy (RFK) stated the air strike: 
[W]ould represent a sneak attack on a small nation with all the memory of 
Pearl Harbor . . . destroy[ing] the U.S.’s moral position and alienat[ing] 
friends and allies. The whole post-war effort of trying to organize the 
combined strength of the Free World would be in shards and tatters.18 
Another one of JFK’s considerations was the lack of knowledge about the 
Soviet Union’s perspective on these developments.19 
Strike: Analysis 
Although it is difficult to determine the full Zone of Possible Agreement 
(ZOPA) guiding this situation, some oversimplified ZOPA options include:  
U.S. inaction; U.S. use of military force; and any strategies falling in-between the 
two options. The possible Worst Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement 
(WATNA) of an air strike include: responsive Soviet military actions in Berlin or 
Turkey; loss of American allies around the world; rising support of communism in 
Latin America; aggravation of relations between the Soviet Union and United States; 
and ultimately, a nuclear war. Conversely, the Best Alternative to a Negotiated 
Agreement (BATNA) to a U.S. air strike involved the Soviet Union to dismantle 
their offensive weapons in Cuba after communications and negotiations.20 
ExComm’s initial consideration to conduct an air strike on Cuba echoes 
Donald Trump’s approach to resolving conflicts. Specifically, Trump suggests: 
“The worst thing you can possibly do in a deal is seem desperate to make it. The 
best thing you can do is deal from strength, and leverage is the biggest  
 
15. Id. at 78–80. 
16. STANTON, supra note 7, at 167. 
17. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, supra note 4, at 99. 
18. Id. at 122. 
19. STANTON, supra note 7, at 171 (“[JFK] had recently read Barbara Tuchman’s book The Guns 
of August, which cataloged the errors that led to the start of World War I, and the risk of catastrophe 
from one side misinterpreting the other’s signals haunted him. [JFK stated:] ‘We were not going to 
misjudge . . . or precipitously push our adversaries into a course of action that was not intended or 
anticipated.’”). 
20. For a more in-depth discussion about the effects of multi-party dispute resolution on 
calculating the ZOPA, WATNA, and BATNA, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Introduction & Coda, in 
COMPLEX DISPUTE RESOLUTION: VOLUME II: MULTI-PARTY DISPUTE RESOLUTION, DEMOCRACY, 
AND DECISION MAKING (Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ed. 2012).  
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strength you can have . . . .”21 Furthermore, a Trumpian strategy to resolving 
conflicts includes fighting back: 
[F]ight back very hard. The risk is that you’ll make a bad situation worse . . . 
but my experience is that if you’re fighting for something you believe in—
even if it means alienating some people along the way—things usually work 
out for the best at the end.22 
As such, Donald Trump would have likely encouraged and advocated for the 
option of military intervention in the Soviet construction of offensive-weapon bases 
in Cuba. He would have likely argued that the United States obtained leverage by 
covertly discovering the Soviet Union’s activities and should have utilized this 
leverage to “fight back” against the threat to its national security by conducting an 
air strike on Cuba. Donald Trump’s approach likely would not have entailed major 
considerations for the U.S. allies or for alienating Latin America. It would have likely 
incited more conflict, possibly resulting in a third world war or even a nuclear war. 
Certainly, Trump’s advice is contextually tied to the business and real estate realms 
and may not be applicable here. Nevertheless, in Negotiation: Processes for Problem 
Solving, Professor Menkel-Meadow would drastically disagree with such a power-
hungry, isolationist negotiation mindset regardless of context. 
At such an early stage of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States was truly 
unaware of the Soviet Union’s actual motives, desires, and interests. The likelihood 
of the United States learning these unknown variables about the Soviets after an air 
strike would drastically decrease. Converse to Donald Trump’s approach to conflict 
resolution, Deborah Tannen would likely discourage the air strike on Cuba because 
“opposition does not lead to truth when an issue is not composed of two opposing 
sides but is a crystal of many sides. Often the truth is in the complex middle, not 
the oversimplified extremes.”23 Professor Menkel-Meadow would likely support 
Deborah Tannen because “[b]inary, oppositional presentations of facts in dispute 
are not the best way for us to learn the truth; polarized debate distorts the truth, 
leaves out important information, simplifies complexity and often obfuscates rather 
than clarifies.”24 Professor Menkel-Meadow’s lessons of negotiating through a 
collaborative and creative approach to problem solving—involving innovation and 
preservation of relationships—directly conflict with the decision of utilizing military 
force in Cuba and with Donald Trump’s approach to conflict resolution. 
 
21. TRUMP, supra note 10, at 37. 
22. Id. at 41. 
23. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 8, at 14 (quoting DEBORAH TANNEN, THE 
ARGUMENT CULTURE: MOVING FROM DEBATE TO DIALOGUE 3–4, 8, 10 (1998)). 
24. Id. (quoting Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, 
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 6–10 (1996)). Andrea Kupfer Schneider’s article also 
illustrates that an adversarial approach to conflict resolution is far less effective than  
true problem solving, or even cautious problem solving approaches. Id. at 132 (quoting Andrea 
Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143, 171-75 (2002)). 
Final to Printer_Danielyan (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2019  6:35 PM 
994 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:989 
Although ExComm balanced the United States’ national security with 
potential detrimental consequences of an air strike, two additional factors greatly 
weighed against its decision to use military force: (1) an “air strike was drastic and 
irrevocable action”;25 and (2) the air strike would not resolve anything because the 
Soviet Union could continue shipping weapons to Cuba. Professor Menkel-
Meadow’s in-class discussions best categorize the former consideration: “It is always 
easier to escalate than it is to deescalate a situation.”26 Furthermore, an air strike 
would not only aggravate the Soviet Union and Cuba, but it would also be an 
extreme reaction to a situation with numerous unknown variables. Professor 
Menkel-Meadow would likely discourage the air strike option also because it is not 
wise to be “the hammer that hits every nail it sees . . . [instead], successful 
negotiations require thorough analysis.”27 The Cuban situation “was too volatile for 
such an escalation, and [JFK] wanted to give the Soviets a chance to back down 
before taking irrevocable action.”28 
In spite of Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon’s, Theodore Sorensen’s 
(“Sorensen”), and CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate’s ardent support for 
the air strike29, ExComm decided to forego any advantages of a surprise air strike. 
Instead, ExComm elected to make a public statement, send nonencrypted 
communications to U.S. military bases, and place a blockade (also referred to as 
“quarantine”) on Soviet ships. 
Blockade/Quarantine: Factual Background 
Sorensen’s written report of ExComm’s available options, dated October 20, 
1962, stated that the graduated strategy of implementing a blockade “is a more 
prudent and flexible step which enables [the U.S.] to move to an air strike, invasion 
or any other step at any time it proves necessary, without the ‘Pearl Harbor’ posture.”30 
Sorensen also wrote that the blockade is “the step least likely to precipitate general 
war while still causing the Soviets—unwilling to engage our Navy in our waters—
to back down and abandon Castro.”31 ExComm believed that although a blockade 
would not automatically achieve the United States’ goal of eliminating Soviet 
weapons from Cuba, it would “not begin with sudden death, and it was a first step, 
not a last.”32 In his correspondence to JFK on October 17, 1962, the  
U.N. Ambassador, stated that “talking with K[hrushchev] would afford a chance of 
 
25. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, supra note 4, at 79. 
26.    Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Negotiations Lecture at University of California, Irvine 
School of Law  
27.     Id. 
28. STANTON, supra note 7, at 168. 
29. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, supra note 4, at 116–18, 128–32, 134–43. 
30. Id. at 133 (emphasis added). 
31. Id. 
32. STANTON, supra note 7, at 168. 
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uncovering his motives and objectives far better than correspondence thru the 
‘usual channels.’”33 
Some ExComm proponents of the air strike thought the blockade decision 
was not a strong or adequate response to seemingly offensive Soviet actions. In 
response to these concerns, ExComm’s decision to implement the blockade was 
accompanied with a public announcement, indicating United States’ knowledge of 
the Soviet developments in Cuba, and nonencrypted communications to U.S. bases 
around the world. Upon JFK’s speech addressing the nation on October 22 
(analyzed in the second part of this Note), nearly all “U.S. military forces worldwide 
increased their alert status to Defense Condition (“DEFCON”) 3 . . . [and]  
U.S. nuclear forces were placed on an even higher alert footing, DEFCON 2, only 
one step away from DEFCON 1,” which meant war.34 These communications were 
strategically sent as nonencrypted messages in order to ensure the “Soviet 
intelligence would not mistake the seriousness of the U.S. military preparations to 
wage nuclear war.”35 It is also important to mention that before informing 
Khrushchev and the world of its decision, the United States informed the United 
Nations of the Soviet missile developments in Cuba—an analysis of the United 
Nations’ involvement is included in the Negotiation and Mediation Section below. 
Blockade/Quarantine: Analysis 
ExComm’s decision to place a blockade on Soviet ships carrying military 
equipment to Cuba can best be categorized as an action to: (1) keep the parties at 
the negotiation table; (2) decrease the likelihood of detrimental consequences; and 
(3) afford the negotiation counterpart an opportunity to voice his demands and/or 
concerns. This approach best mirrors the concepts from Professor Menkel-
Meadow’s course—specifically, concepts highlighting cooperative or collaborative 
(over competitive) methods of negotiations. Professor Menkel-Meadow and 
Kenneth Thomas believe: 
There are those who compete (or seek to maximize their own self-interest, 
even at the expense of others), those who cooperate (seeking to work with 
the other side to find some middle or compromise grounds) . . . and those 
who collaborate (by seeking to work for joint and mutual gains for all parties, 
without unnecessary harm to others or needless compromise or giving 
in).36 
Whereas a U.S. air strike would be a classical decision to compete with the 
Soviet Union, the U.S. decision to place a blockade on Soviet ships contains 
elements of cooperative and collaborative schools of negotiation. 
 
33. See THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, supra note 4, at 119. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 8, at 9 (citing Kenneth Thomas, Conflict and Conflict 
Management, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY (Marvin  
V. Dunnette ed., 1976)) (emphasis in original). 
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ExComm’s blockade decision also accomplished several negotiation tactics 
articulated by Roger Fisher and William Ury.37 Specifically, the United States utilized 
a problem-solving mindset, which allowed it to ask questions, test assumptions, and 
maintain relationships—not only with the Soviet Union but also with U.S. allies. By 
not “striking first and asking questions after,” ExComm created an opportunity to 
bargain over positions as opposed to interests (analyzed further below in my analysis 
of the communications between JFK and Khrushchev). ExComm analytically 
created a strategic and open first step towards negotiating the elimination of 
offensive-weapon bases in Cuba. Professor Menkel-Meadow suggests that 
“unearthing a greater number of the actual needs of the parties will create more 
possible solutions because not all needs will be mutually exclusive.”38 In light of the 
many unknown variables guiding the Soviet Union’s intentions, accomplishing the 
“unearthing [of] a greater number of the actual needs” would have been difficult 
with an immediate air strike on Cuba.39 As such, ExComm’s blockade decision 
allowed the United States to invent an option for possible future mutual gain.40 This 
would allow ExComm to learn the Soviet Union’s needs, demands, deal points, and 
deal killers in future negotiations while preventing the alienation of U.S. allies and 
maintaining the American moral character. Additionally, the blockade option would 
allow the parties to keep talking—one of Roger Fisher’s tools in negotiations.41 
Professor Menkel-Meadow also believes better solutions to conflict are those 
with minimal transaction costs.42 The U.S. decision to place a blockade on Soviet 
ships, increase DEFCOM levels, and make a public announcement had fewer 
transaction costs than the air strike option. Implementing a blockade served as a 
statement of the United States’ dissatisfaction with Soviet actions, while sending 
nonencrypted communications—increasing DEFCOM levels throughout  
U.S. military bases—further strengthened the United States’ position. In fact, Peter 
T. Coleman and Saul Alinsky would likely support the tactical maneuver of 
increasing DEFCOM levels through nonencrypted communications because they 
believe that the perception of power matters in a negotiation.43 Saul Alinsky writes: 
“Power is not only what you have but what the enemy thinks you have . . . .”44 
Regardless of the United States’ desire to engage in an all-out war, these 
communications served as a crafty method of conveying the United States’ readiness 
and willingness to stand by its position. 
 
37. See generally FISHER ET AL., supra note 9. 
38. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 8, at 125 (quoting Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward 
Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 795 (1984)). 
39. Id. 
40. See generally FISHER ET AL., supra note 9. 
41. Id. 
42. See MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 8, at 127 (quoting Menkel-Meadow, Toward 
Another View of Legal Negotiation, supra note 36). 
43. Id. at 266. 
44. Id. 
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Thus, the United States engaged in a thorough analysis of the situation by 
analyzing its options, viable Soviet responses to each option, and, most importantly, 
the likelihood of the United States achieving its goals through each course of action. 
This degree of negotiation preparation placed the United States in a position to 
better understand Khrushchev’s desires while retaining control of the further 
negotiations. 
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN JFK AND KHRUSHCHEV 
Frame Your Position, but Remain Open to Mediation. 
This part of the paper focuses on JFK’s and Khrushchev’s negotiations tactics 
through their written communications to one another, and the importance of 
mediation. 
Announcement/Quarantine 
On October 22, 1962, JFK wrote a letter to Khrushchev and made a televised 
announcement to the United States, officially implementing the blockade through 
Congressional acquiescence.45 The letter briefly mentioned previous discussions 
between JFK and Khrushchev in Vienna and outlined the position of the United 
States. JFK’s televised announcement to the nation not only solidified the topics of 
his correspondence to Khrushchev in greater detail but also strategically increased 
transparency of the situation by informing the world about Soviet actions in Cuba. 
JFK’s decision to make this announcement resembles Professor Menkel-Meadow’s 
former University of California Los Angeles Law student’s decision to waive 
confidentiality in a settlement, foregoing a higher settlement amount, merely to shed 
light on a specific issue. This way, if the Soviet Union preemptively conducted a 
military strike on mainland United States, JFK would have had the United  
States’ position and events leading up to the attack on record for the world to know. 
Douglas Stone believes that the “primary task [in difficult conversations] is 
not to persuade, impress, trick, outwit, convert, or win over the other person. It is 
to express what you see and why you see it that way, how you feel, and maybe who 
you are.”46 As such, JFK’s announcement indicated that the United States saw 
recent Soviet activity in Cuba directly conflict with previous Soviet promises that 
the “military equipment sent to Cuba [be] designed exclusively for defensive 
purposes.”47 These inconsistencies made the United States feel deceived, forcing 
JFK to announce, “The United States of America nor the world community of 
nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any 
 
45. See THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, supra note 4, at 148–54. 
46. DOUGLAS STONE ET AL., DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS: HOW TO DISCUSS WHAT 
MATTERS MOST 185 (1999). 
47. See THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, supra note 4, at 150–54. 
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nation . . . .”48 Furthermore, JFK painted an image of who the United States was by 
concluding his announcement with mention to the “character and courage” of the 
nation, “vindication of right” instead of “victory in might,” and never choosing the 
path of “surrender or submission.”49 
Post-Quarantine 
The next four communications between JFK and Khrushchev illustrate each 
leader’s attempts to persuade the other leader of his position while preserving his 
reputation.50 
October 23 
Khrushchev’s response to JFK’s televised announcement claimed the United 
States’ blockade on Soviet ships was a “serious threat to peace and to the security 
of nations[,] . . . violat[ing] the United Nations Charter and international norms.”51 
Khrushchev stood his ground, claiming that the Soviet missiles in Cuba were 
“intended solely for defensive purposes.”52 
Professor Menkel-Meadow believes that in addition to substantively preparing 
for negotiations, good negotiators could also “base [their] argument on good policy, 
a principle to be upheld, or general custom in that type of business,” setting 
seemingly objective criteria for the negotiation.53 Additional methods of bolstering 
an argument include framing and analogy.54 In fact, psychologists, management 
consultants, and communications experts agree that “framing” establishes “a stable 
coherent cognitive structure that organizes and simplifies [complex realities].”55 
Here, Khrushchev framed himself as a helping ally, contextually providing Cuba 
with defensive weapons following the Bay of Pigs invasion. He further appealed to 
general international customs and principles of the United Nations in an attempt to 
suggest the United States was the aggressor, and that the blockade should be lifted. 
In fact, framing the weapons in Cuba as either offensive or defensive was a crucial, 
foundational argument in each leader’s communications. By framing the weapons 
as offensive, JFK illustrated the need for mitigating measures in light of 
Khrushchev’s earlier promises not to supply offensive weapons to Cuba. 
Conversely, Khrushchev’s framing of the weapons as defensive allowed him to 
argue a lack of wrongful actions by the Soviet Union. 
JFK framed most of his correspondences by adhering to reason in attempts 
to mitigate the severity of the situation while “cheerleading” for a non-violent 




50. See THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, supra note 4, at 156, 161–64, 173. 
51. Id. at 156. 
52. Id. 
53. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 8, at 108. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 109. 
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his concern that the leaders “show prudence and do nothing to allow events to make 
the situation more difficult to control than it already [was].”56 
October 24 and October 25 
In a responsive October 24 correspondence, Khrushchev claimed JFK was 
“not declaring a quarantine, but rather [was] setting forth an ultimatum and 
threatening that if [the Soviet Union does] not give in to [JFK’s] demands, [the 
United States would] use force.”57 Khrushchev then pled for empathy and reason 
by asking what the United States would do if such an “ultimatum” was presented 
to it, implying that the Soviet response was perfectly rational. “Consider what you 
are saying!” Khrushchev wrote, “And you want to persuade me to agree to this!”58 
He attacked JFK’s use of reason, claiming the United States was the unreasonable 
and irrational party. Lastly, Khrushchev framed his position through an appeal to 
general principles as his main source of authority: “International law exists and 
universally recognized norms of conduct exist. We firmly adhere to the principles 
of international law and observe strictly the norms which regulate navigation on the 
high seas, in international waters.”59 
In addition to framing his position, Khrushchev also utilized his reputation  
in his correspondence. Professor Menkel-Meadow believes that reputation is 
important when negotiating, or expecting to negotiate again, with the same 
counterparts or adversaries.60 In support of this notion, Catherine Tinsley further 
notes that in a negotiation context “a player’s reputation is embodied in the beliefs 
of others about the strategy that the player will use . . . . Thus, game theorists tend 
to define a person’s reputation as another’s expectation of how that person will 
behave.”61 Tangentially, although Daniel L. Shapiro suggests “emotions can hinder 
the ability of negotiators to reach a wise agreement,” using emotions could possibly 
affect the other party’s expectation of how the emotional negotiator will behave in 
the future.62 
In his October 24 correspondence, Khrushchev adhered to his reputation of 
being a strict, abrasive, emotional and possibly erratic leader. Previously, in 1956, at 
a Polish Embassy in Moscow, Khrushchev told the Western ambassadors, “We will 
bury you!”63 In 1960, at a Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, 
Khrushchev notoriously took off his shoe and pounded it on the desk in protest at 
 
56. See THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, supra note 4, at 161–62. 
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21, 2019).  
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a speech by a Philippine delegate. Khrushchev’s reputation for being emotional, 
illustrated in his use of exclamation marks in his correspondences to JFK, 
strategically created an air of mystery and unpredictability about the Soviet mentality 
and actions. Juxtaposed with JFK’s calm and collected correspondences and 
demeanor, Khrushchev’s erratic leadership persona could partially explain why 
JFK’s calculations with ExComm regarding the United States’ response had to be 
carefully deliberated. 
In his October 25 responsive correspondence, JFK continued to portray the 
United States’ position as one of reasonable necessity. He reiterated his perception 
of the crisis while hoping that the two superpowers would “take necessary action to 
permit a restoration of the earlier situation.”64 Utilizing his reputation for using 
reason in these negotiations, JFK successfully conveyed a strong Western front 
without aggravating the situation or provoking the Soviet Union in any way. 
Negotiation and Mediation 
The next five October communications between JFK and Khrushchev 
focused on outlining each leader’s desired outcomes, finding common ground in 
seeking peaceful relations, and most importantly, agreeing to send representatives 
to mediation sessions with the United Nations.65 In these communications, 
Khrushchev initiated the first official offer by proposing to remove the weapons 
from Cuba and make a pledge to the United Nations to do so in return for United 
States’ removal of similar weapons from Turkey and making a promise not to attack 
Cuba. Khrushchev wrote that U Thant, the Acting Secretary General of the United 
Nations, “to some degree has assumed the role of a mediator” and that the Soviet 
Union “consider[s] that he will be able to cope with this responsible mission, 
provided, of course, that each party drawn into this controversy displays good 
will.”66 
Professor Menkel-Meadow believes mediation is a wholesome and efficient 
conflict-resolution mechanism. Specifically, mediation is inclined to: improve 
participation and self-determination (each party retaining control over the process 
and the outcome); result in a better outcome while generating creative problem 
solving (including forward-looking strategies in developing options and optimal 
outcomes); and foster relationships and build bridges between parties.67 Leonard 
Riskin68 further distinguished the different types of mediators: e.g. the facilitative 
mediator is one who “assumes the parties are intelligent, able to work with their 
counterparts, and capable of understanding their situations better than . . . the 
 
64. See THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, supra note 4, at 173. 
65. Id. at 185–88, 197–99, 223–25, 226–32. 
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mediator.”69 Furthermore, a facilitative meditator assumes that his “principal 
mission is to enhance and clarify communications between the parties in order to 
help them decide what to do.”70 
Throughout the mediation process, U Thant facilitated this dispute resolution 
by “sen[ding] appeals and messages, relay[ing] proposals, offer[ing] reassurances, 
advanc[ing] the ‘non-invasion for missiles’ formula that formed the basis of the final 
agreement, shuttl[ing] to Cuba to mollify Castro, and help[ing] secure a verification 
agreement.”71 Reconciling the United States’ fears of the Soviet weapons being 
located in Cuba with Soviet fears of the United States engaging in military combat 
with Cuba, Thant urged the Soviets to dismantle their missiles immediately in return 
for an American guarantee not to invade Cuba. Since Thant advocated this idea 
publicly—utilizing the benefits of public decisions mentioned above—it became 
the basis for the final agreement days later. Furthermore, to quell Soviet concerns 
regarding U.S. missiles in Turkey, Thant encouraged JFK to make a secret 
commitment to Khrushchev to remove said missiles.72 Acting as the facilitative 
mediator during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Thant was able to “quickly grasp  
the . . . issues, . . . respond to the dynamic of the situation, [and] help the parties 
realistically evaluate his proposals to determine whether they address[ed] the parties’ 
underlying interests.”73 By engaging in the mediation sessions, the two global 
superpowers of the time were able to retain their perceived positions of power. 
Conversely, reaching a deal outside of mediation may have appeared as a 
superpower’s concession and thus submission of power—an outcome desired by 
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union. 
CONCLUSION 
Through my analysis of the first thirteen days of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it is 
evident that prior to negotiating, the best action a party can take is adequate, 
thorough and strategic preparation. Analyzing the potential ZOPA, WATNA, and 
BATNA while remaining cognizant that certain factors may not yet be evident, 
creates a solid foundation for future negotiations. Although framing a position, 
adhering to relevant authority, and creating and maintaining a reputation during 
negotiations could help move negotiations forward, resorting to the authority of a 
mediator should always remain an option—especially, in complex matters with 
sophisticated, strong parties. Even though the Cuban Missile Crisis was not fully 
resolved within these thirteen days, by engaging in further mediations, the United 
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States was able to avoid potential global catastrophe. JFK himself, regarding the 
mediation sessions, stated: “U Thant has put the world deeply in his debt.” 
 
